Executive Compensation: When is Reasonable Compensation Unreasonable? by Williamson, Richard A.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
William & Mary Annual Tax Conference Conferences, Events, and Lectures
1972
Executive Compensation: When is Reasonable
Compensation Unreasonable?
Richard A. Williamson
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1972 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/tax
Repository Citation
Williamson, Richard A., "Executive Compensation: When is Reasonable Compensation Unreasonable?" (1972). William & Mary
Annual Tax Conference. Paper 438.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/tax/438
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION-WHEN IS REASONABLE
COMPENSATION UNREASONABLE?
PROFESSOR WILLIAMSON:
In the short time allocated to the general topic of executive compensation,
it is obviously impossible to cover all of its significant and troublesome as-
pects. In addition, it is dangerous to generalize as to the applicable principles
to be followed in planning executive compensation in the small, closely held
corporation. Terms such as "reasonableness" and "arm's-length transactions"
predominate in the area and, of course, lead to a great deal of uncertainty and
inability on the part of the tax advisor to predict with any degree of confi-
dence the fate of an executive compensation program. The whole area of
executive compensation might be best described by that old saying, "While
the discreet take counsel, the fool doth his business." There is one saving
factor, at least from the tax advisor's point of view-only successful clients
cause worry about executive compensation problems. I am sure that there is
no one here today who would trade his stable of successful clients for the
luxury of not having to worry about such matters.
I have selected for discussion two areas related to the deductibility of
executive compensation. First, I will briefly examine the statutory and
regulatory standards applied in determining such deductibility, particularly
in light of two significant cases. Second, I shall turn to an analysis of de-
ductibility problems and attempt to articulate the precautions that can be
taken to protect against disallowance. My talk might appropriately be labeled,
When is Reasonable Compensation Unreasonable?
Section 162(a)(1) of the Code permits a deduction for ordinary and
necessary business expenses, including a deduction in the form of a "reason-
able allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered." The regulations1 provide that the "test of deductibility
in the case of compensation payments is whether they are reasonable and are
in fact payments purely for services." Thus, it is clear that there are two
aspects that must be considered before a deduction will be permitted,
namely, whether the dollar amount paid was "reasonable" in terms of the
value of personal services rendered and whether the payments were in fact
only for such personal services.
In most cases the sole focus of judicial inquiry has been directed to an
independent examination of the "value" of services rendered by the em-
ployee. 2 If the court concluded that the true value of the services rendered
was below that actually paid, the excess was viewed as payment for some
other purpose, usually as a distribution of profits.3 This approach to the
'Regs. § 1.162-7(a).
2 See cases collected in No. 202-2nd, Tax Management Portfolio, "Reasonable Com-
pensation" (1971).
3 1t is possible, however, that the alleged compensation payments could be viewed
as payment for property. See Regs. § 1.162-7(b)(1) wherein an example of such treat-
ment is set forth involving the sale of partnership assets to a corporation and subsequent
payments to the former partners, alleged to be salary payments, but in fact constituting
payment for the transfer of assets to the corporation.
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problem is contemplated also by the regulations which illustrate the test of
deductibility involving a small, closely-held corporation by saying, "If .. .the
salaries are in excess of those ordinarily paid for similar services and the
excessive payments correspond or bear a close relationship to the stock-
holdings of the officers or employees, it would seem likely that the salaries
are not paid wholly for services rendered, but that the excessive payments
are a distribution of earnings upon the stock. ' 4
Thus, the second aspect of the test (the "purpose" of payments) was not
viewed as an independent criterion, but rather merely as a conclusion once
the court determined that the payments were "excessive" in terms of the
value of services actually rendered.
In planning and defending executive compensation programs we, as tax
advisors, have tended to become preoccupied with factors such as the salary
history of the individual, 5 the salary situation in comparable businesses, 6
the degree of individual contribution to the success of the business, 7 and the
expertise of the individual, 8 factors which all go to prove the issue of the
"reasonableness" of compensation. It was assumed, and with good reason,
that if personal services were in fact rendered and if what was paid was
"reasonable," there could follow but one conclusion-the deduction should
be allowed in full.
The validity of that assumption, however, is undermined by at least two
cases, one of fairly recent origin and the other not so recent. I am sure the
cases I refer to are familiar to you, so I will only briefly refresh your recol-
lection of the facts and proceed to analyze what those cases should say to us
in terms of planning an executive compensation program.
Taking the cases up in reverse chronological order. I will discuss first
Charles Mcandless Tile Service v. United State 9 The McCandless case in-
volved the issue of the reasonableness of salaries paid to two officer-director-
shareholders, father and son. Although the facts are somewhat unclear, it ap-
peared that, in the three-year period during which the salaries paid were in
question, the two owned equally all or substantially all of the outstanding
stock of the corporation. Not surprisingly, the amount paid to each was equal.
It was clear, however, that from a corporate viewpoint the two determined the
amount of compensation paid to themselves. The corporation was highly
profitable and, according to the court, the individual officer-shareholders
whose salaries were questioned were "largely responsible" for the corpora-
tion's success. The court considered the compensation paid to the two "in
and of itself to have been within the realm of reasonableness" based largely
4 Regs. § 1.162-7(b)(1).
5 See, e.g., Pacific Grains, Inc., 36 T.C. Memo 67, 399 F.
6 See, e.g., Jones Bros. Bakery, Inc. v. U. S., 411 F.2d 1282 (Ct. Cl., 1969).
7 See, e.g., Appleton Electric Co., 36 T.C. Memo 1144 (1967).
8 See, e.g., Superior Pattern & Mfg. Co., 28 T.C. Memo 299 (1959).
9422 F.2d 1336, 25 AFTR 2d 870 (Ct. CI., 1970).
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on the degree of success enjoyed by the business. Nevertheless, the court
went on to conclude that a portion of the payments should be disallowed.
The decision was based on that part of the previously mentioned regulations
which require that, to be deductible, the payments must be "purely for
services" actually rendered. The court, noting the complete absence of any
dividends paid during the period, concluded that "any return on equity
capital is so conspicuous by its absence as to indicate... that the purported
payments necessarily contained a distribution of corporate earnings within."
In a footnote to the opinion, the court acknowledged that the retention in
the corporation of one-half of pretax profits (the other half being paid as
salaries) was apparently motivated by conservative business policies, that is,
to build up operating capital reserves. The court, however, also noted that
only a small portion of such reserves were in fact utilized for such purposes.
You all know the scenario-the court arbitrarily concluded that, in a corpora-
tion of this nature, a "reasonable" return to the shareholders would be 15
percent of profits before salaries and taxes and accordingly disallowed as a
deduction a portion of the purported compensation payments equal to such
figure. By way of secondary interest, we might all wonder why the court used
a percentage of profits rather than investment as the basis for determining a
reasonable return to the shareholders.
In my opinion the decision of the Court of Claims in the McCandless
case was fundamentally correct even though the court's factual analysis and
justification for the decision leave something to be desired. The case does,
however, emphasize certain salient factors to be considered by the tax advisor
in planning an executive compensation program, factors which have been
overlooked in the past.
The fundamental principle to be taken from the McCandless case is that
an evaluation of the sanctity of an executive compensation program cannot
be made in a vacuum, that is, by focusing solely on the dollar level of pay-
ments to the exclusion of other equally important factors. We are, after all,
dealing with a corporation. In a corporation there are three primary demands
placed on gross earnings:
1. the need to meet ordinary and necessary business expenses, including
most importantly for our purposes, compensation of the executives;
2. the need to retain some money in the corporation to meet operating
and capital expenditure needs; and
3. the need to compensate those who have taken the investment risk-the
shareholders.
Our present tax structure treats each of these needs differently. For example,
it permits a deduction for executive compensation in arriving at net taxable
income, but it does not permit a deduction for dividends paid to share-
holders. It does not penalize with a surtax a corporation paying dividends,
but does penalize an unjustifiable accumulation of net earnings above a
certain amount. In the contemplated corporate model, the officers who must
be compensated, the directors who fix such compensation and determine
dividend levels, and the shareholders who expect a return on their investment,
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are not one in the same person and we might say, have adverse interests.
With such a model the system works well in that we can assume that the de-
cisions that are made in meeting the three demands placed on gross earnings
are not motivated wholly by tax considerations. In the case of a small,
closely-held corporation with its identity of management and ownership, it
is impossible to say from an economic standpoint that the demands on cor-
porate earnings, at least as between executive compensation and shareholder
return, are influenced by independent market factors. The short and simple
truth is that such demands are usually influenced by tax considerations.
Thus, the Court of Claims was focusing on the basic issue when it concluded
that, even though the dollar level of executive compensation was reasonable,
the taxpayer's justification for its treatment of the two other competitive
demands on corporate gross earnings was lacking. The court was saying, in
effect, that in a real-life situation when you pay 50 percent of net earnings,
before deducting salaries and taxes, to reasonably compensate your execu-
tives, absent a compelling demand to retain the remaining earnings in the
corporation for operating capital, market factors would dictate that the
shareholders, as an entity, would realize a substantial return on their invest-
ment. Since in the McCandless model, no dividends were paid and there was
no showing of a need to retain earnings in the corporation, the court could
only conclude that part of the payments to the officer-shareholders was a
disguised dividend. A contrary result would have been intellectually dis-
honest. The "purpose" of the payments, viewed from an "objective" point
of view, that is, a corporation influenced by traditional competitive demands
on its gross earnings, was not wholly to compensate the officers for personal
services. It was for some other purpose, namely, to compensate them in their
capacity as shareholders. Thus, the second part of the statutory and regulatory
tests was not met.
I do not mean to imply that the foregoing analysis of the Code, Regula-
tions and the McCandless case make traditional concerns in planning executive
compensation programs invalid or that the Service will no longer challenge
executive compensation in a particular case as being clearly excessive in terms
of the true dollar value of services rendered. Instead, I am merely saying that
in addition to laying the foundation to support the dollar level of compensa-
tion, we must also be concerned with analyzing and laying the proper founda-
tion to justify our treatment of the other two competing demands on cor-
porate gross earnings. Have we adequately compensated the shareholders as
contemplated by the traditional corporate model and the tax structure?
That inquiry requires consideration of the need and justification for our
decision to retain or not to retain a portion of earnings in the corporation
for other needs.
It has been said that the McCandless case stands for the proposition that
the courts may be moving toward the adoption of an "automatic dividend"
rule. 10 In my opinion no such result is inherent in the decision. AfCandlss
1032 Journal of Taxation 331 (1970).
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does, however, emphasize the importance of a close analysis of the total
earnings picture of a corporation in terms of its relevance to a sound deter-
mination of the reasonableness of executive compensation. Such an analysis
of the McCandless case calls for one additional observation. Even though the
case involved a complete absence of dividends, it would not be a big step for
a court to say that a conservative dividend policy, in a situation such as the
McCandless case, was so unreasonable in light of the total earnings picture as
to mandate a reconstruction of distributions to employee-shareholders.
The second case that I wish to discuss is Klamath Medical Service Bureau
v. Commissioner, a 1958 Tax Court case subsequently affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit.11 The Klamath case involved a medical service corporation engaged
in the business of selling prepaid medical, surgical and hospital contracts. All
of the shareholders were local physicians who entered into agreements with
the taxpayer to perform medical services for contract holders according to a
fee schedule fixed by the taxpayer. The taxpayer's principle source of income
consisted of premiums paid by subscribers, but additional income was
derived from noncontract patients who used its hospital facilities. The
physician-shareholder's contracts with the taxpayer provided that each
physician would receive for services rendered a percentage of his base fees, as
determined by the fee schedule, equal to the percentage of the taxpayer's net
income contributed by each physician, less a proportionate amount retained
for corporate purposes. During the early years of operation, the physicians
received less than 100 percent of their billings. However, in the three years
in question, the physicians received 115, 116 and 134 percent of their
billings.
The Tax Court, in limiting the deduction to 100 percent of gross billings
of each physician, appeared to adopt a rather quixotic position concerning
the "reasonableness" of the salaries. It noted that the fee schedule was un-
reasonably low when compared to like services provided by physicians en-
gaged in private practice but, nevertheless, was equitible and fair when the
lessened costs provided by the taxpayer were considered. It was clear, how-
ever, that the Tax Court did not consider the "reasonableness" of the pay-
ments made to the physicians as dispositive of the issue, since the court
correctly noted that unless the full amount paid was compensation for
services and not a partial distribution of earnings, a deduction for the full
amount was properly denied by the Service. The basis of the court's con-
clusion that the excess amount paid over 100 percent amounted to a dis-
tribution of earnings was that each physician had, in advance, agreed to ac-
cept the taxpayer's payments, in accordance with the fee schedule, in full
payment for services rendered, regardless of the fact that such might be less
than "reasonable." Contractually, the taxpayer had fully discharged its
obligation to its shareholder-employees, in accordance with its previously
1129 T.C. 339, aff'd. 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cir., 1958).
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fixed obligation, when it paid out 100 percent of the billings submitted by
such persons. Payments in excess of 100 percent of billings, said the court,
were not "authorized" by the employment contracts.
There was, of course, additional evidence that the taxpayer "intended" a
portion of the payments to be a distribution of earnings. For example, testi-
mony of one of the directors of the taxpayer was to the effect that the total
amount paid to the physicians was a year-end decision arrived at after con-
sidering future corporate needs for operation and expansion, the excess being
distributed to the physicians. Thus, much of the McCandless case analysis is
also applicable to the situation presented in Klamath.
However, I believe the Klamath case is more important for its implicitness
about the relevance of the contractual or previously fixed obligation to com-
pensate employees. Charles Finley may tear up the contract of Vida Blue in
mid-season or pay a substantial bonus to Gene Tenance after the World Series
without regard to the earnings of the Oakland Athletics, but corporations with
normal management personnel who respect the expectations of shareholders
do not "bonus-out" earnings at year-end.
The dilemma is obvious. In terms of evidencing the reasonableness of com-
pensation, although the absence of a previously negotiated contract is not
fatal, 12 nor is it fatal that compensation is fixed retrospectively or is in
excess of that previously fixed, 13 the desirability of an advance, formal, fixed
obligation to pay is clear, especially when there are two or more owner-
employees who negotiate on an arm's-length basis. However, the existence of
such a previously fixed contractual obligation to pay, when the issue at stake
is whether the payments were in fact compensation for services rendered,
should be viewed by the courts as a neutral factor. Whether the amount paid
was "reasonable" is, of course, a different question and with respect to that
issue, the existence of a previously fixed obligation should be viewed as
highly persuasive in support of the deductibility of the amount in full. The
fixing of the obligation in advance is genuinely influenced by factors other
than tax considerations, the most obvious one being the credit standing of
the taxpayer.
However neutral the existence of the fixed obligation to pay is with respect
to proving that the whole amount paid was in fact for services actually render-
ed, once the obligation is created, a mid-stream or year-end variance from the
figure should be viewed as extremely probative in indicating that payment
was not in fact for such services.
I certainly do not mean to imply that year-end bonuses are per se non-
deductible. Given the right set of circumstances and full consideration of
factors discussed in connection with the McCandless decision, a bonus may
12 E. B. & A. C. Whiting Co., 10 T.C. 102 (1948).
131. R. Schmalls Go., Inc. v. U. S., 406 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir., 1969).
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be perfectly acceptable. For example, when the fixed obligation is clearly
below that which otherwise would have been reasonable in light of the year-
end profit picture, the payment of a bonus should be easy to support if, when
added to annual compensation previously paid, it would still permit adequate
treatment of the other competing demands on corporate gross earnings. The
principal lesson to be taken from the Klamath case is that we must emphasize
to the client that the figure fixed in advance, be it set or contingent, must be
considered carefully before being immortalized in writing and not be one
which carries with it the presumption of being "renegotiable" freely at year-
end when the profit picture is known and greater than expected. In terms of
the statutory and regulatory tests, the excess payments could easily be
viewed as for some other purpose, since the contractual obligation was ful-
filled by payment of a lower figure. As the Court of Appeals said in affirming
the Tax Court decision in the Klamath case, the increased payments may have
been "ordinary" in the sense that they were "reasonable," but they were
clearly not "necessary" in the sense that the contractual obligation of the
corporation was clearly satisfied by the payment of a lesser amount. 14
14261 F.2d at 848.

